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TORT LIABILITY FOR ILLINOIS SCHOOLS UNDER
SECTION 9-103 OF THE ILLINOIS TORT IMMUNITY
ACT
Donald J. Kerwin*
School law continues to be one of the most dynamic areas of
Illinois practice. In this Article, Mr. Kerwin analyzes two cases
presently before the Illinois Supreme Court which will decide
the standard of liability applicable to school districts and their
employees in school tort situations. The cases will also decide
whether the purchase of liability insurancepursuant to section
9-103 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act constitutes a waiver of
immunity for negligent conduct where a cause of action is
grounded on the Tort Immunity Act. The author analyzes the
statutes involved, the cases which have interpreted the statutes
and their historical background.
INTRODUCTION

In recent months, the Illinois Supreme Court has seen fit to
grant leave to appeal in two First District Appellate Court cases,
Chilton v. Cook County School Dist. No. 207' and Kobylanski v.
Board of Education.2 Both cases involve seminal issues whose
determination could have profound effects upon the standard of
liability of school districts and school employees in circumstances
where pupils are injured while engaged in school activities.
In Chilton, the appellate court held that a section of Illinois'
School Code,3 which provides that in all matters relating to disci* Mr. Kerwin, formerly law clerk to Justice Robert J. Downing of Illinois' First District
Appellate Court and a shareholder in the Des Plaines law firm of Romberg & Kerwin, is
currently engaged in the practice of general civil law in Chicago, specializing in personal
injury and products liability litigation as well as appellate practice.
1. 26 Ill.App.3d 459, 325 N.E.2d 666 (1st Dist. 1975), leave to appeal granted, 58 Ill.2d
596 (1975).
2. 22 Ill.App.3d 551, 317 N.E.2d 714 (1st Dist. 1974), leave to appeal granted, 57 Ill.2d
608 (1975).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1973). The section provides in pertinent part:
Teachers . . . shall maintain discipline in the schools. In all matters relating
to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they
stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship
shall extend to all activities connected with the school program and may be
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pline in and conduct of schools and school children, teachers and
other educational employees stand in a relation of parents and
guardians to pupils, does not bind a plaintiff-pupil to a standard
of proof of wilful and wanton misconduct in the supervision of
students before liability could be imposed upon the defendant
school district.4 The opinion of the court in Chilton was the first
in this state's history to so interpret the statute in question.
In stark contrast, the Kobylanski court, in reviewing an action
by a pupil to recover for personal injuries under the provisions of
the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act,5 concluded that no liability can attach to teachers
for mere negligence in student supervision or maintenance of discipline, as a teacher's status is that of a parent or guardian to all
students, and the liability of a parent to a child does not adhere
6
absent wilful and wanton misconduct.
Beyond the issue of the standard of liability applicable to
school districts and their employees in school tort situations, the
Kobylanski case presents the Illinois Supreme Court with an additional, related question which begs for a determination:
whether section 9-103 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act,7 pursuant to which school districts and their employees may obtain
liability insurance to insulate them from liability for injury or
death, constitutes a waiver of immunity for negligent conduct
where such insurance has been purchased and where a cause of
action is predicated upon the Tort Immunity Act.
This Article, then, will undertake a detailed analysis of Chilton
and Kobylanshi and a survey of the cases which preceded them
in Illinois, as well as a brief discussion of some of the decisions in
other jurisdictions dealing with the subject of school torts; a review and analysis of the development of governmental tort imexercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the absence
of their parents or guardians.
4. 26 Ill.App.3d at 465, 325 N.E.2d at 671.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (1973).
6. 22 Ill.App.3d at 553, 317 N.E.2d at 716. Kobylanski concerned the interpretation of
section 34-84a of the School Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-84a (1973). The only real
difference between this section and the one involved in Chilton, § 24-24, is that section
34-84a applies to school districts with populations upwards of 500,000 inhabitants whereas
section 24-24 is applicable to districts having fewer than 500,000 population.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103 (1973).
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munity; and, finally, a commentary upon what the author feels
will be the far-reaching ramifications should the supreme court
decide to affirm in Chilton and reverse in Kobylanski.
CHILTON V. COOK COUNTY SCHOOL DIST.

No. 207

At the outset, it will be helpful to compare and contrast in full
not only the appellate court opinions in Chilton and Kobylanski,
but, in addition, the respective arguments propounded by the
parties in briefs.
On April 25, 1968, 15-year-old Suzanne Chilton, a freshman at
Maine Township High School East, was severely injured while
performing a trampoline stunt, known as a "front drop," during
her physical education class at the school, one of several within
defendant school district. An action was brought to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant
school district and an instructor employed by defendant in maintaining and supervising the trampoline class. A jury returned a
verdict for plaintiff solely against the district, finding the instructor not to have been guilty of negligence, and a judgment was
entered upon the verdict. On appeal, defendant challenged, inter
alia, the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint, in that the complaint
had failed to allege that defendant and the instructor were guilty
of wilful and wanton misconduct in supervising the class.'
The school district's principal contention on appeal was that
the trial court had erred in failing to direct a verdict in its behalf,
arguing that section 24-24 of the School Code' bound the plaintiff
8. The evidence further revealed that at the time of plaintiff's injury, the school required all freshmen, regardless of any demonstrated ability, to enroll in a trampoline
course as part of its physical education program. The record showed that Suzanne Chilton
had experienced some difficulty in accomplishing the "front drop" prior to the day of
injury, but that she had been encouraged and given personal coaching in the maneuver
by her instructor. Three or four trampolines were in use at the time of the accident, and
approximately 20-25 students were participating. Their activities were overseen by a
single instructor, who was assisted by a number of student "spotters" whose responsibilities included pushing bouncing pupils to the center of the trampoline if they were to
venture too near its periphery. The instructor viewed each of the trampolines in operation
alternately and was stationed about ten feet from plaintiff, watching another student's
performance, when plaintiff was injured. In previous years, there had been upwards of 70
trampoline-related injuries at the school, from sprained thumbs to serious fractures. 26
Ill.App.3d at 461, 325 N.E.2d at 668.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1973).
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to a standard of proof of wilful and wanton misconduct"0 in the
supervision of students in school activities before liability could
be imposed upon the district. Defendant further urged that section 24-24 bestowed broad discretionary powers upon Illinois educators, who were said to legally stand in a parental relationship
vis-&-vis their pupils" "in all activities connected with the school
program,"' 2 which, of course, would include the institution's
physical education curriculum. The parental cloak, defendant
argued, would therefore extend to its relationship with plaintiff-an in loco parentis relation-in the supervision of the trampoline class in which she was injured, requiring plaintiff to plead
and prove wilful and wanton misconduct, as opposed to mere
negligence.
Plaintiff sought to counter these arguments in Chilton by asserting that a thorough, close reading of section 24-24 of the
School Code made it apparent that the proviso with respect to the
maintenance of discipline was intended by this state's legislature
to extend and apply only to those situations which could be characterized as disciplinary in nature. The statute, plaintiff maintained, was no more than a codification of the common law rule
existing at the time of its enactment in 1965 that a teacher stood
in loco parentis for purposes of discipline only, which would include the meting out of corporal punishment. 3
10. For the purposes of this Article, a working definition of wilful and wanton miscon-

duct can be found in Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, 394 11. 569, 583, 69 N.E.2d
293, 300 (1946), where the court stated:
A wilful or wanton injury must have been intentional or the act must have been
committed under circumstances exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of
others, such as a failure, after knowledge of impending danger, to exercise ordinary care to prevent it or a failure to discover the danger through recklessness
or carelessness when it could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary
care.
11. When one occupies the place of the parent, he is liable only for wilful and wanton
misconduct against his ward and not for ordinary negligence. Mroczynski v. McGrath, 34
Ill.2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137 (1962); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1955);
Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank v. Heap, 128 Ill.App.2d 165, 262 N.E.2d 826 (1st Dist. 1970).
The rationale for the rule of parental non-liability for ordinary negligence derives from
judicial reluctance to generate litigation and create strife among family members. See
Nudd v. Matsoukas, supra at 619, 131 N.E.2d at 531. A second rationale arises from the
state's interest in maintaining family harmony. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, supraat 454,
216 N.E.2d at 140.
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-24 (1973).
13. See Wexell v. Scott, 2 Ill.App.3d 646, 276 N.E.2d 735 (3d Dist. 1971).
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To underscore the validity of its arguments, defendant school
district in Chilton directed the court's attention to a spate of
cases which had interpreted section 24-24 as compelling plaintiffs
in a range of school tort situations to allege and prove wilful and
wanton misconduct, as opposed to negligence, before liability
could attach. Woodman v. Litchfield Community School Dist.
No. 12's concerned permanent injuries suffered by an 8-year-old
pupil, who was kicked in the head by a fellow student, after
having been directed by his teacher to pick up papers from the
classroom floor. The Woodman complaint alleged that the instructor's negligent supervision of the classroom activity was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The appellate court, however, affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.
In Fustin v. Board of Education,'5 the plaintiff was injured after
having been intentionally punched in the face by one of the players on the defendant's varsity basketball team during the course
of a regularly scheduled game between two high schools. Plaintiff
maintained that the school district had violated section 24-24 of
the School Code in that it had failed to restrain its bellicose team
member, as well as having failed to provide satisfactory supervision of the participants in the contest. The Fustin court concluded that in situations involving highly organized sporting activities, such as the basketball program out of which plaintiff's
injuries resulted, school officials were empowered with discretion
in the selection, preparation, and supervision of school teams, a
the
broad discretionwhich is to be upheld and respected unless
6
misconduct.'
wanton
and
wilful
reflect
officials
of
actions
In Mancha v. Field Museum of NaturalHistory7 a claim was
directed by a student against a school district for injuries sustained when several youths, unconnected with plaintiff's school,
assaulted him while he was touring a museum as part of a schoolsupervised field trip. The plaintiff charged that the district had
been negligent in permitting students to leave the school premises
without adequate supervision and claimed that the teachers who
had accompanied the group failed to properly supervise the
14.
15.
16.
17.

102 Il.App.2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780 (5th Dist. 1968).
101 II.App.2d 113, 242 N.E.2d 308 (5th Dist. 1968).
Id. at 121, 242 N.E.2d at 312.
5 I1l.App.3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1st Dist. 1972).
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group's activities while at the museum. The trial court dismissed
the suit, and, on appeal, the dismissal was affirmed. The Mancha
panel, in reaffirmation of the Woodman principles regarding section 24-24, noted that nothing which might constitute wilful and
wanton misconduct had been alleged in the complaint."8 In finding that no duty had been breached, the court stated in part:
The burden sought to be imposed on the defendant School District and teachers is a heavy one which would require constant
surveillance of the children. A baseball game, a football game
or a game of hopscotch played on school grounds might break
up a [sic] fight resulting in serious injury to one or more of the
children. A teacher cannot be required to watch the students at
all times while in school, on the grounds, or engaged in schoolrelated activity.9
Beyond Woodman, Fustin, and Mancha, Clay v. Board of
Education0 provided further authority for defendant's announced posture on appeal in Chilton. In Clay, plaintiff brought
a personal injury action against the Chicago Board of Education
for damages arising when a fellow student allegedly struck plaintiff while in a classroom. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was
guilty of one or more wilful and wanton acts or omissions, including the failure to provide adequate protection for students in the
classroom, permitting dangerous instrumentalities to be left
within the reach of students, and the failure to exercise a degree
of supervision commensurate with the known circumstances. 2
18. Id. at 703, 283 N.E.2d at 902.
19. Id. at 702, 283 N.E.2d at 901-02. Merrill v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 8 Ill.App.3d
910, 290 N.E.2d 259 (2d Dist. 1972) is another decision which seemed to clearly support
defendant's position in Chilton. Merrill involved a plaintiff-pupil who had lost the sight
in his left eye after he had been injured while cutting lengths of wire at the direction of
his art class teacher. The question on appeal was whether a non-profit, private school and
its staff were liable for personal injuries suffered by a student due to ordinary negligence.
The court held that section 24-24 was applicable to determine the general propriety of the
supervision of students in school activities, both in private and public schools. Id. at 911,
290 N.E.2d at 260. It is to be noted that on appeal in Merrill the plaintiff proffered the
specific argument put forth by the plaintiff in Chilton: that section 24-24 was limited in
its application to disciplinary situations only. The Merrill court found otherwise.
20. 22 Ill.App.3d 437, 318 N.E.2d 153 (1st Dist. 1974).
21. Id. at 438, 318 N.E.2d at 154. Note that in Clay, the plaintiff alleged wilful and
wanton misconduct; in the other cases reviewed thus far the allegations have consistently
remained within the realm of negligence.
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After having discussed the Woodman and Mancha decisions, the
court held that the trial court had been correct in its decision that
a cause of action for wilful and wanton misconduct had not been
stated against the defendant."
In response to the decisions cited by defendant in Chilton,
plaintiff urged that the attendant factual circumstances in four
of those cases were easily distinguishable from the facts in the
case at bar. Woodman (student kicked in the head by another
student while picking up papers), Fustin (student punched in the
face by member of opposing basketball team), Mancha (student
beaten by others unaffiliated with student's school while on museum trip), and Clay (student struck by another student while in
classroom) all involved uniquely disciplinary situations, plaintiff
argued, and each concerned personal injuries resulting from intentional acts of third parties."
Its survey of relevant authority complete, the Second Division
of the First District Appellate Court, speaking in Chilton through
Justice Downing, stated:
With all due respect to the courts which have ruled upon the
question, it is our opinion that section 24-24 of the School Code
did not bind the plaintiff in this case to a standard of proof of
wilful and wanton misconduct in the supervision of students in
school activities before any liability whatsoever could be imposed upon defendant. We do not believe that the legislature of
this state intended, by its enactment of section 24-24, to extend
the section's applicability to situations other than those which
are disciplinary in nature. 4
The court then dispensed with other allegations of error regarding
22. Id. at 441, 318 N.E.2d at 156.
23. The opinion in Merrill v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 8 Ill.App.3d 910, 290 N.E.2d
259 (2d Dist. 1972), supra note 19, where a pupil was injured while cutting wire in art class,
followed the reasoning and holding of the Woodman panel. Plaintiff claimed that the
Merrill court had not distinguished between the disciplinary character of the activity in
Woodman and the supervisory activity of the art teacher in Merrill; therefore, plaintiff
concluded, the Merrill case was not persuasive authority regarding defendant's stance in
Chilton.
24. 26 Ill.App.3d at 465, 325 N.E.2d at 671. The court went on to state:
Further, with reference to the record before us, we note that the trial court
refused to instruct the jury that the in loco parentis standard was applicable to
the case at bar and that the trial court declared that the basis for its ruling on
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the admissibility of evidence and affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Cook County.
Subsequent to Chilton, the Second Division of the First District rendered an opinion in Wilson v. Kroll, 5 a case reflecting
strikingly similar factual circumstances, party alignments, and
legal issues as those found at the heart of Chilton. Wilson was
concerned with an action for damages against a school district
and one of its teachers for negligence in the supervision of a physical education class, where plaintiff, a first grade pupil, suffered
injuries when he fell from a horizontal ladder. Defendants moved
to dismiss on the ground that, by virtue of section 24-24 of the
School Code, defendants stood in loco parentis to the minor
plaintiff, and, thus, could not be sued for acts of ordinary negligence; the trial court granted the motion. In reversing the dismissal, the court stated in part:
In Chilton v. Cook County School Dist. No. 207,

. . .

this

court recently considered the issue presented by the instant
case, to wit: whether a school district is responsible for injuries
sustained by a student in the course of a physical education
class as a result of the district's alleged negligence (as opposed
to wilful and wanton misconduct) ...
The reasons set forth in that opinion are controlling here.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint."6
The Chilton decision, and its only legal offspring, Wilson,
which is not up for review by the supreme court, fascinates in
many respects. First of all, its arrival allows the supreme court
itself to grapple with the statutory interpretation of section 2424 of the School Code as it relates to the standard of liability of
school districts and their employees in tort situations. Until now,
the intricate questions raised by the section have been addressed
only by courts of appeal in three (the first, second and fifth) of
the point was its belief that section 24-24 applied only to disciplinary situations.
We agree, and we find that the cited section does not specifically outline a
broader basis for a school's disciplinary and supervisory powers and does not
make such broader basis a matter of state law.
Id. at 465-66, 325 N.E.2d at 671.
25. 26 Ill.App.3d 954, 326 N.E.2d 94 (lst Dist. 1975).
26. Id. at 955, 326 N.E.2d at 94.
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the state's five districts. Moreover, a tentative wave of excitement has been brought on by the decision among those who travel
in plaintiff-oriented circles, those who would relish a change from
the nearly-impossible-to-meet wilful and wanton standard to a
far more simple negligence standard. There is another side to that
coin, however. No doubt, the insurance industry is looking for,
and indeed expecting, a reversal in Chilton, so as to put a stop
to any erosion, however seemingly insignificant, of the current
status quo.
Other jurisdictions, of course, have adopted and maintained a
negligence standard where schools have been brought to account
for student injuries. For example, in Bellman v. San Francisco
High School District" a 17-year-old pupil was injured in a tumbling class, in which she had enrolled under protest, when she
improperly performed a "roll over two" tumbling exercise. The
evidence before the courts revealed that the girl's instructor did
not coach students directly, that the girl had a bad knee, and that
the "roll over two" exercise demanded complete coordination. 8
Bellman held that a judgment on the girl's behalf was justified,
either on the theory that the exercise was not suitable for high
school girls, that the teacher knew or should have known that the
girl was not in the proper condition for such instruction, or that
the teacher did not properly instruct the girl.29 An 11-year-old, in
Gardnerv. State of New York, 3" dislocated a vertebra in her neck
after having fallen in the performance of a headstand in a physical education class. It was held that there had been presented
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the failure to instruct
the claimant in accordance with the customary method of instruction was the proximate cause of her injuries.' In a more
recent New York case, Keesee v. Board of Education of the City
of New York, 3" plaintiff was injured in the course of a line soccer
game played on the gymnasium floor of her junior high school;
plaintiff was an involuntary participant in the game. The court
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

11 Cal.2d 576, 81 P.2d 894 (1938).
Id. at 582-85, 81 P.2d at 897-98.
Id. at 583, 81 P.2d at 898.
281 N.Y. 212, 22 N.E.2d 344 (1939).
Id. at 217, 22 N.E.2d at 346.
37 Misc.2d 414, 235 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. Trial Div. 1962).
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held that the evidence established the school board's negligence
in permitting the game to be played under such conditions that
eight relatively inexperienced girl students actively contended for
possession of the ball at one time.33
Chilton, then, by reason of its maverick interpretation of section 24-24, brings to our supreme court an issue of first impression.
KOBYLANSKI

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION

Turning now to the Kobylanski case,3" which was decided some
months prior to Chilton, the plaintiff therein appealed from orders of the trial court directing a verdict in favor of defendant
school board and one of its physical education instructors, James
Lecos, and the denial of plaintiff's post-trial motion for a new
trial. The action sought to recover damages for personal injuries
under the provisions of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act,35 and on appeal plaintiff
argued that the trial court had erred, in that a prima facie case
of negligence had been proven.
Plaintiff, a seventh-grader at the Mark Twain Elementary
School in Chicago, suffered spinal injuries while attempting to
perform on an exercise apparatus known as the "rings" during a
physical education class. Her teacher had given directions on the
manner in which to perform on the "rings" prior to her accident.
Defendants were covered by liability insurance at the time of
plaintiffs injury, and, in answer to her complaint, set forth as a
defense section 34-84a of the Illinois School Code" which differs
from section 24-24 of the Code in only one respect. The former
applies to districts with populations upwards of 500,000 inhabitants, while the latter is applicable to those having fewer than
500,000 people.
In the appellate court, plaintiff contended that where public
entities and their employees had obtained liability insurance,
33. Id. at 417, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 303. For a more extensive list of cases in other jurisdictions concerned with school torts see Forde, Liability of Schools for Injuries to Students,
17 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1 (1973).
34. 22 Ill.App.3d 551, 317 N.E.2d 714 (1st Dist. 1974).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (1973).
36. ILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-84a (1973). The section reads in part:

Teachers ...

shall maintain discipline in the schools. In all matters relating
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liability for personal injuries could be founded upon ordinary
negligence. Further, plaintiff asserted that section 34-84a was
inapplicable to the facts of the case, and, moreover, that the
doctrine of "parental immunity" was eroding in Illinois, especially where the concept was sought to be introduced into the
teacher-pupil relationship. Its introduction there was simply not
justified, because the threat to family harmony was not present.
Justice Lorenz, in delivering the opinion for the Fifth Division
of the First District Appellate Court, found that although section
34-84a of the School Code had not been the subject of appellate
review, its twin, section 24-24, had. After an analysis of the case
law interpreting section 24-2411 the court stated:
It cannot be disputed that plaintiff's injuries in the instant
case occurred during activities directed by a teacher as part of
the school program. In view of the interpretation given to identical language in section 24-24, we conclude that section 34-84a
of the School Code of 1961 is applicable to the facts as pleaded
by plaintiff.38
The court next considered plaintiff's argument that defendants' procurement of liability insurance constituted a waiver of
whatever protection section 34-84a of the School Code afforded
defendants. It was plaintiff's claim that section 9-103(b) of the
Tort Immunity Act 3" functioned as an effective waiver of a public
to the discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they
stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship
shall extend to all activities connected with the school program and may be
exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the absence
of their parents or guardians.
37. Justice Lorenz analyzed the decision in Merrill v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 8
III.App.3d 910, 290 N.E.2d 259 (2d Dist. 1972), and found it to be in accord with those in
Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural History, 5 Ill.App.3d 699, 283 N.E.2d 899 (1st Dist.
1972); Woodman v. Litchfield Community School Dist. No. 12, 102 Ill. App.2d 330, 242
N.E.2d 780 (5th Dist. 1968); and Fustin v. Board of Educ., 101 Ill.App.2d 113, 242 N.E.2d
308 (5th Dist. 1968). See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
38. 22 IIl.App.3d at 553, 317 N.E.2d at 716.
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-103(b) (1973). The section reads:
Every policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity shall provide
or be endorsed to provide that the company issuing such policy waives any right
to refuse payment or to deny liability thereto within the limits of said policy by
reason of the non-liability of the insured public entity for the wrongful or negligent acts of itself or its employees and its immunity from suit by reason of the
defenses and immunities provided in this Act.
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entity's right to deny its liability for negligent conduct. In rejecting this argument out-of-hand, without real comment on its true
parameters, the court stated:
The applicable provisions found in the School Code of 1961
do not require, as does section 9-103 of the Tort Immunity Act,
any waiver of defenses or immunity from suit. The Tort Immunity Act does not purport to impose liability on school districts
where no liability otherwise exists. Furthermore, the existence
or non-existence of insurance coverage is not a proper factor in
determining liability. 0
As a consequence, the panel concluded that plaintiff's complaint, alleging ordinary negligence, was insufficient as a matter
of law. "It was therefore proper," the court said, "for the trial
judge to direct a verdict in favor of defendants and deny plaintiff's motion for a new trial."'"
With all due respect to the court in Kobylanski, a far more
detailed exigesis of the arguments offered by both parties to the
appeal on the issue of insurance coverage may have been in order.
Throughout the Kobylanski proceedings, before both the appellate and supreme courts, plaintiff has maintained these positions:
(1) the Local Governmental and Governmental Tort Immunity
Act of 196542 controls the matter at bar; (2) the purchase of liability insurance by defendants-a local governmental entity and one
of that entity's employees-extends insurance coverage to defendants for liability for the injuries complained of by plaintiff; (3)
the purchase of insurance coverage by defendants waives grants
of immunities and defenses which may have been otherwise available to defendants in the absence of such insurance; (4) any defense to liability for negligence provided defendants by section 3484a of Illinois' School Code, if such defense is available to them
in the first instance, is waived by reason of the provisions of
section 9-103(b) of the Tort Immunity Act of 1965; and (5) because section 9-103(b) was enacted after43 the mandatory procurement of insurance provisions set forth in section 34-18.1 of Illinois'
40.
41.
42.
43.

22 IlI.App.3d at 554, 317 N.E.2d at 716 (citations omitted).
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (1973).
The date of enactment was August 13, 1965.
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School Code44 and because defendants have available to them
only those defenses and immunities provided in the Tort Immunity Act of 1965, with regard to their liability for negligent conduct,
section 9-103(b), as concerns the waiver of immunity, is applicable to the School Code insurance provisions.
In response to those positions, defendants have maintained: (1)
the Tort Immunity Act is in no manner involved in the case; (2)
the purchase of liability insurance is irrelevant to the facts of the
occurrence therein complained of; (3) section 9-103(b) applies
only to defenses and immunities provided in the Tort Immunity
Act of 1965, and not elsewhere; (4) the provisions of section 3484a of Illinois' School Code provide a defense to defendants,
which defense is not waived pursuant to section 9-103(b) of the
Tort Immunity Act of 1965; (5) because section 2-111 of the Tort
Immunity Act of 1965, which reads: "[n]othing contained herein
shall operate to deprive any public entity of any defense heretofore existing and not described herein," 45 was enacted subsequent
to section 34-84a of the School Code, the defense claimed by
defendants under the latter section would continue to be available to defendants.
In what follows, the author analyzes the statutes involved and
surveys the cases which have interpreted the statutes and their
historical background. He will also interpret what he believes to
have been the legislature's clear intent in enacting section 9103(b), which is that the purchase of liability insurance by local
governmental entities acts to waive any defenses and immunities
from tort liability available to those entities.
44. Enacted on August 26, 1963, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18.1 (1973) reads:
Protection from Suit. The board of education shall insure or indemnify and
protect the board, any member of the board or any agent, employee, teacher,
student teacher, officer or member of the supervisory staff of the school district
against financial loss and expense, including reasonable legal fees and costs
arising out of any claim, demand, suit, or judgment by reason of alleged negligence . . . or alleged wrongful act resulting in death or bodily injury to any
person or accidental damage to or destruction of property, within or without the
school premises, provided such board member of the supervisory staff, at the
time of the occurrence resulting in such death, bodily injury, or damage to or
destruction of property was acting under the direction of the board within the
course and scope of his duties.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-111 (1973).
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It is a basic concept underlying the whole law of torts today
that liability follows negligence, and that individuals and corporations are responsible for the negligence of their agents and
employees acting in the course of their employment. . . . What
reasons, then, are so impelling as to allow a school district, as a
quasi-municipal corporation, to commit wrongdoing without
any responsibility to its victims, while any individual or private
corporation would be called to task in court for such tortious
conduct?48
The above question was posed in the landmark Molitor case
and answered in the negative. In an extensive review of the constitutional, statutory, and common law framework of tort immunity for governmental entities, the supreme court could find
no valid reasons for immunizing public bodies-and specifically
school districts-from liability for acts of simple negligence.
Hence, the common law doctrine of governmental immunity was
abolished and the defendant school district in Molitor was held
liable for the negligence of its employee-bus driver in injuring
student passengers in an accident.
The abandonment by the Molitor court of the immunity doctrine47 served as an impetus for the modern development of the
doctrine in this state. The Molitor court made clear its rejection
of theories proffered over the decades in support of immunity
when it declared:
We are of the opinion that none of the reasons advanced in
support of school district immunity have any true validity
today."
The rationale underpinning the decision in Molitor was
founded upon a reevaluation, in light of the norms then current
in society, of the so-called sovereign immunity defenses: on the
one hand, that "the king can do no wrong;" on the other, that the
46. Molitor v. Kaneland Community School Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 20, 163 N.E.2d 89, 93
(1959).
47. The immunity doctrine was adopted by Illinois courts with reference to towns and
counties in Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870), and was extended to shield
school districts in Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898).
48. 18 1Il.2d at 24, 163 N.E.2d at 95.
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satisfaction of tort claims by school districts was an improper
diversion of public educational funds. The court's reappraisal of
the defenses mentioned led to a sweeping away of both the "unerring king" argument, as well as the "protection-of-public-funds"
theory. Regarding the former, the court said:
It is almost incredible that in this modern age. . . the medieval
absolution implicit in the maxim, 'the king can do no wrong,'
should exempt the various branches of government from liability for their torts, and that the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of the government should be imposed
upon the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than
distributed among the entire community . . ..
Of the latter theory, the court said:
We do not believe, in this day and age, when public education
constitutes one of the biggest businesses in the country, that
school immunity can be justified on the protection-of-publicfunds theory ...
Private concerns have rarely been greatly embarrassed, and
in no instance, even where immunity is not recognized, has a
municipality been seriously handicapped by tort liability. 0
PosT-MolitorLEGISLATION
There resulted in the wake of Molitor a disjointed, discordant
rush of legislative activity and judicial decisions concerning the
subject of governmental immunity, a flurry which finally culminated six years later in the enactment by the legislature of the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act of 19651' (hereinafter the Tort Immunity Act of 1965).
Another statute enacted in response to Molitor, the 1959 School
Tort Liability Act,5" applied to schools and school districts the
proprietary-governmental distinction, which had previously been
drawn concerning the immunity of municipal corporations, ren49. Id. at 21, 163 N.E.2d at 94, citing Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 88, 136
P.2d 480, 482 (1943).
50. 18 I11.2d at 22, 163 N.E.2d at 94-95.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (1973).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821-31 (1973).
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dering them wholly immune from tort liability in their governmental functioning and limiting their liability in tort for proprietary functions to $10,000.1
With respect to arguments in Kobylanski, the legislature, in
section 821 of the 1959 School Tort Liability Act, stated the policy
reasons behind the statute's enactment.
The General Assembly finds and hereby enacts as . . . public
policy . . . that public schools in the exercise of purely governmental functions should be protected from excessive diversion
of their funds . . . and that non-profit private schools conducted by bona fide eleemosynary or religious institutions
should be protected from excessive diversion of their funds for
purposes not directly connected with their educational functions ."4
Moreover, the legislature showed concern for the impropriety of
precluding recovery to injured persons owing to governmental
immunity. In the statute's preamble, the legislature states "that
there should be a reasonable distribution among the members of
the public at large of the burden of individual loss from injuries
incurred as a result of negligence in the conduct of school affairs."5"
In addition to the 1959 School Tort Liability Act, the 1959
Illinois legislature passed several statutes in direct response to the
Molitor decision, granting full tort immunity to park districts
generally,5" the Chicago Park District,57 forest preserve districts,"
and counties.5" However, most of those stopgap statutes were
subsequently found to have been constitutionally defective.
53. Id. §§ 821, 825. See also Coteleer, Illinois School Tort Immunity: 1959 to the
Present, 2 LOYOLA (CHI.) L.J. 131, 136-37 (1971).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 821 (1973).
55. Id.
56. Law of July 9, 1959, ch. 105, § 12.1-1 [1959] Ill. Laws 782 (repealed 1967).
57. Law of July 22, 1959, ch. 105, § 333.2a [1959] Ill. Laws 2020 (repealed 1965).
58. Law of July 22, 1959, ch. 57/2, § 3a [1959] Ill. Laws 1954 (repealed 1965).
59. Law of July 22, 1959, ch. 34, § 301.1 [1959] Ill. Laws 1890, as amended ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (1973).
60. See Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist. No. 84, 39 Ill.2d 136, 233
N.E.2d 549 (1968); Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit Dist. No. 1, 35 Ill.2d 362,
220 N.E.2d 161 (1966); Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill.2d 379, 214 N.E.2d 274 (1966); Harvey
v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
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JUDICIAL RESPONSE IN

Harvey

The decision in Harvey v. Clyde Park District" provided the
foundation for a major part of the judicial assault made upon the
1959 legislation, which had been prompted by the holding in
Molitor. Harvey applied section 22 of Article IV of the 1870 Illinois Constitution," which prohibited special legislation, to strike
down a section of the Park District Code, which granted park
districts immunity from suit for their negligent acts. The case
concerned a negligence action on behalf of a minor who had sustained injuries on a faulty playground slide. The defendant park
district alleged that it was wholly immune from liability. The
court held that the immunity statute in question was special
legislation, in violation of the Illinois Constitution, and, as such,
was unconstitutional. No rational distinction could be found between the playground facilities maintained by the park district
in Harvey and those provided by schools or the state, against
whom recovery, though limited, would be available.
As it had responded to the earlier Molitor decision, the legislature again responded quickly to the pronouncements of Harvey,
which was viewed by some as shaking the foundations of the
General Assembly's pattern of immunity, 3 and the legislature
enacted the Tort Immunity Act of 1965. The Act was written to
comply with the constitutional interpretation rendered in
Harvey, granting immunities solely upon the basis of the function
of a local public entity, rather than upon a particular, arbitrary
classification of persons or of governmental units. In addition, the
legislators of this state were guided in their drafting by the California Tort Claims Act of 1963.84
SECTION

34-18.1

OF ILLINOIS' SCHOOL CODE

Before turning to a more detailed discussion of section 9-103 of
61. 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
62. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (1870). The ban on special legislation is presently contained
in ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1970).
63. See Coteleer, supra note 53, at 141-43.
64. CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966). See also Baum, Tort Immunity of Local
Governments and Their Employees: An Introduction to the Illinois Immunity Act, 1966
U.ILL.L.F. 981, 985.
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the Tort Immunity Act of 1965 under scrutiny by the supreme
court, it should be noted, again, that plaintiff's cause of action
in Kobylanski was predicated upon a violation of the Act itself.
While section 9-103(b) of the Act applies to all local public entities which choose to avail themselves of its provisions, school
districts with populations upwards of 500,000 (the Chicago School
District and the Chicago Board of Education) have been required,
since 1963, to provide the insurance designated in section 34-18.1
of Illinois' School Code. 5 Section 34-18.1 does not require that
any liability policy issued pursuant to its provisions contain a
"waiver of immunity" clause; section 9-103(b) does require the
clause. It is clear, however, that the section 9-103(b) requirement
concerning the "waiver of immunity" clause would apply as well
to policies obtained pursuant to section 34-18.1, as section 9103(b) maintains its requirements for "[e]very policy for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity," not only for those
which happen to have been purchased in accordance with section
9-103.
In any event, both defendants in Kobylanski had purchased
liability insurance, which, by dint of section 9-103(b), is to provide a waiver of immunity for tort liability, as described in the
section.
Thomas v. Broadlands Community
Consolidated School District: SECTION 9-103(b) OF THE TORT

CODIFICATION OF THE RULE OF

IMMUNITY ACT OF

1965

In Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District,6 the court made clear
that section 9-103(b) of the Tort Immunity Act of 1965 was an
attempt to codify the decision in Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District,7 which established in Illinois law that the possession of liability insurance by a governmental entity, such as that required to be obtained by defendants
in Kobylanski pursuant to section 34-18.1 of Illinois' School Code
and made available to defendants by section 9-103, acted as a
waiver of immunity from suit for injuries arising from the risk
insured against.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18.1 (1973). See note 44 supra.
66. 51 III.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972).
67. 348 III.App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (3d Dist. 1952).
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After having considered arguments in support of a grant of
immunity in Thomas, the court concluded that the arguments
sounded in the two rationales mentioned earlier in this article:
first, in the axiom that "the king can do no wrong," and second,
that public policy dictated that funds intended for "public purposes" should not be diverted to the satisfaction of private tort
judgments. The Thomas court concluded that the first rationale
was not a proper basis upon which to grant immunity, reasoning
that the better approach would be to distribute the burden of tort
liability to the community of which the responsible governmental
unit was a part, so as to prevent an injured person from suffering
the loss without a remedy. Regarding the second rationale,
diversion of public funds, while the court found the principle
sound, it nonetheless concluded that where liability insurance
protected a governmental entity, the justification for the grant
of immunity ceased to exist. The court stated:
When liability insurance is available to so protect public funds,
the reason for the rule of immunity vanishes to the extent of
68
available insurance.
In other words, the Thomas court reached the result that the
procurement of insurance adequately protected the diversion of
public funds.
The progressive rule of the Thomas decision with respect to
insurance waiver has been adopted by numerous state courts, as
well as by the legislatures of several states. 9
LEGISLATIVE INTENT: SECTION

9-103(b)

With the passage of the Tort Immunity Act of 1965, then, this
68. Id. at 576, 109 N.E.2d at 641.
69. See, e.g., Hall County v. Loggins, 110 Ga.App. 432, 138 S.E.2d 699 (1964); Geislinger v. Village of Watkins, 269 Minn. 116, 130 N.W.2d 62 (1964); Brown v. City of Omaha,
183 Nebr. 430, 160 N.W. 2d 805 (1968); White v. Mote, 270 N.C. 544, 155 S.E.2d 75 (1967);
Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26c, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961); Ballew v. Chattanooga,
205 Tenn. 289, 326 S.W.2d 466 (1969); Medlar v. Aetna Ins. Co., 127 Vt. 337, 248 A.2d
740 (1968); Marshall v. Green Bay, 18 Wis.2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN.,
§ 455.06 (Supp., 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 32.601 et seq. (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN.,
§ 466.06 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., § 412.3 (1968); N. MEX. STAT. ANN., §§ 5-6-18 et
seq. (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 39-01-08 (Supp., 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 1403,
1404, 1406 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN., § 66.18 (1968). See generally Van Alstine,
Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.ILL.L.F. 919.
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state's legislature intended to do away with what had become
known as "the twin evils:" the diminution of public funds by
virtue of tort judgments against governmental entities and the
discouragement of conscientious performance of their duties by
public officials, who might be apprehensive about the possible
harassment or economic catastrophy brought on by negligence
complaints lodged against them. At the same time, the legislature was not insensitive to the plights of claimants created by the
statutory immunity the legislature would grant, and, consequently, provided, pursuant to section 9-103(b), that if a governmental entity was to avail itself of insurance against loss created
by negligence, then the governmental entity would, within the
ambit of the insurance contract itself, waive immunity from actions for negligence.
The effect of section 9-103(b) has been succinctly stated in
Schear v. City of Highland Park7 ° to waive the immunities provided by sections 2-102 through 6-109 of the Tort Immunity Act,

and in Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District7 the immunities
made available by section 3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act of
1965. The court stated in Sullivan:
We must assume that when section 9-103 was enacted the
General Assembly was aware of the history of the doctrine of
local governmental immunity from its adoption in Town of Waltham v. Kemper (1870), 55 Ill. 346, to its abolition in Molitor
. . . Section 9-103(b) is . . . applicable
to all local public
entities who elect to avail themselves of its provisions and obviously is the method selected by the General Assembly to enable the governmental units to which it applies to shift the risk
of loss to an insurance carrier. The enactment of the section may
be evidence of legislative recognition of the dominant role
played by the insurance industry in the field of personal injury
litigation .72
In Housewright v. City of La Harpe,73 the supreme court held
that the acquisition of insurance by local public entities to cover
70. 104 IlI.App.2d 285, 244 N.E.2d 72 (5th Dist. 1968).
71. 51 I1.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972).
72. Id. at 280, 281 N.E.2d at 663.
73. 51 I11.2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972).

1976]

SCHOOL TORT LIABILITY

liability due to wrongful and negligent acts must waive the defenses and immunities provided by the Act, pursuant to the provisos
of section 9-103(b). In Fanio v. John Breslin Co.," the court,
following the reasoning in Housewright, again defined the relationship between the waiver provision of section 9-103 and certain
defenses granted by the Act and held that section 8-101 of the Act
was also subject to the waiver provision. 5
It would seem, in this writer's opinion, that the legislature did
not intend, by its enactment of section 34-84a of the School Code
to immunize, or make available a defense to local public entities
which have procured insurance against tort liability. Section 3484a was enacted during the same session of the legislature as was
the Tort Immunity Act of 1965, and had that body intended to
create a defense such as that upon which defendants in
Kobylanski rely, the proper vehicle for its creation would have
been the Act itself; such a defense-among those specifically and
exclusively granted in the legislation-is nowhere to be found in
the Act.
If the legislature had intended to create what in effect is a nonwaiverable defense for teachers from all their acts of ordinary
negligence while acting within the scope of their employment, it
would have been a simple matter for it to include the subject
matter of section 34-84a within the Tort Immunity Act. It did not
do so and, it is submitted, it did not create such a defense by
passage of section 34-84a either. The intent of that section was
to make it clear, in the interests of the orderly administration of
classrooms, that teachers, like parents, had the right to discipline
students.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, then, where a public entity elects to insure itself
against liability (in Kobylanski such insurance was mandatory)
the entity places itself on the same basis as all other tort defendants, as other public entities were placed immediately following
the Molitor decision, having available to them only those com74. 51 Ill.2d 366, 282 N.E.2d 443 (1972).
75. Id. at 369, 282 N.E.2d at 445. See also Cleary v. Catholic Diocese, 57 Ill.2d 384, 312
N.E.2d 635 (1974); Helle v. Brush, 53 1Il.2d 405, 292 N.E.2d 372 (1973).

462

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:441

mon law defenses which had arisen beyond the confines of the
Tort Immunity Act. Further, where the coverage of the insurance
policy itself is broader than a public entity's liability, it would
seem that liability expands to the full extent of such coverage."
76. Thomas v. Broadlands Consol. School Dist. No. 201, 348 Ill.App. 567, 576, 109
N.E.2d 636, 641 (3d Dist. 1952).
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